Showing posts with label topic: scientist in victorian lit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label topic: scientist in victorian lit. Show all posts

28 April 2023

Was the Word "Scientist" Coined to Describe Mary Somerville?

A friend sent me the following meme the other day:


Along with the request, "Fact check please."

It's nice to have friends who know you.

It's not just this meme; if you Google "mary somerville scientist," Google actually suggests you add the word "coined" and your results are filled with people making similar claims.

Not only could I fact-check it, I already had. It's a story I've seen reproduced many times in various forms. And it is a great story!

However, like many great stories, it's not really true, so I'm going to write it up here so I can just send people this way next time instead of hunting down my references again.

Mary Somerville
The word scientist was coined in 1833, if we want to be pedantic, not 1830. It wasn't coined to describe Mary Somerville specifically, but it was indeed first used in print by William Whewell in a review of her book On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences that appeared in volume 51 of The Quarterly Review in 1834.

However, as James Secord highlights, the term "scientist" only appears in the review as an indication of what Mary Somerville is not:

he did not apply the word to Somerville herself. In his view, she belonged to a more praiseworthy category. Whewell believed that in the rare circumstance when a woman wrote from deep knowledge, she could do so not with a concern for grubby industrial utility but with lucid metaphysical clarity.… If men were active, prone to confusing practice and theory, women were above the fray, giving their reasoning clarity and transparency. By those criteria, Somerville was not a scientist, but instead possessed the superior “talents of a philosopher and a writer.” (48)

If you search the actual review for the word "scientist," it only comes up once, when Whewell is going through a number of different terms you could use to describe "the students of the knowledge of the material world collectively" even when they are all working in different branches of physical science (59). "Scientist" is cited as one possible term proposed at a recent meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, though Whewell doesn't directly claim responsibility for it:

some ingenious gentleman proposed that, by analogy with artist, they might form scientist, and added that there could be no scruple in making free with this termination when we have such words as sciolist, economist, and atheistbut this was not generally palatable (59)

William Whewell
That's the only time Whewell uses "scientist" in the essay, and it is never directly applied to Somerville, though he does say that she, like the British Association, is attempting to keep the different branches of physical science unified. Slightly contra Secord, I don't think Whewell distinguishes Somerville from scientists, so much as from all men:

the man is mystified; he is involved in a cloud of words, and cannot see beyond it. He does not know whether his opinions are founded on feeling or on reasoning, on words or on things. He learns to talk of matters of speculation without clear notions; to combine one phrase with another at a venture; to deal in generalities; to guess at relations and bearings; to try to steer himself by anti theses and assumed maxims. Women never do this: what they understand, they understand clearly; what they see at all, they see in sunshine. [F]rom the peculiar mental character to which we have referred, it follows, that when women are philosophers, they are likely to be lucid ones (65)

But Somerville is not a scientist, she is a philosopher, and Whewell would have coined the word had he written this review of the Connexions or not.


One other thing you have to remember is that people in the nineteenth century actually did not like the term "scientist".... not even Whewell! It sounds like a job, you know. As opposed to the meme, had he called her a scientist, it would have been no honor. (From my own research, I have found that in fiction, the first character to actually be called a scientist wasn't until 1882, Swithin St. Cleeve the astronomer in Thomas Hardy's Two on a Tower, a full fifty years after the word was coined!)

I always liked this line from H. G. Wells's 1904 novel The Food of the Gods:

In the middle years of the nineteenth century there first became abundant in this strange world of ours a class of men, men tending for the most part to become elderly, who are called, and who are very properly called, but who dislike extremely to be called—“Scientists.” They dislike that word so much that from the columns of Nature, which was from the first their distinctive and characteristic paper, it is as carefully excluded as if it were—that other word which is the basis of all really bad language in this country.

If you search the archives of Nature, it's not quite true that the word "scientist" was literally banned (it was first used in Nature in 1872)... but I was able to find that even in 1924 it was still considered controversial, when one Norman R. Campbell wrote in to say that Nature needed to get over itself and accept it:

Moreover, the word has arrived; there is no chance of suppressing it entirely. Even if so far it were confined wholly to the illiterate—which it most certainly is notwe ought (as the authors of "The King's English" say) to "begin seriously to consider whether it has not been resisted as long as honour demands." Cumbrous circumlocutions, such as "man of science"offensive to feminists and with an artificial air no artifice can concealare wretched substitutes. The idea is definite and important; the discovery that there is something common in the intellectual attitude of all the sciences and foreign to other branches of learning is one of the greatest advances made by the thought of the last century. For a new thing (to quote the same authors) we must have a new name.

The Editor of Nature responded, admitting that "the word 'scientist' has not been used in the columns of Nature to designate a man of science or scientific worker," but calling for opinions from the experts on language (Gregory). Most respondents accepted its use, but many of those acceptances were pretty begrudging, such as that of R. W. Chambers:

Personally, I should say “man of science” rather than “scientist”; but I do not think one can deny to the word scientist its legitimate place in English. It is recorded in the “Oxford Dictionary,” together, I admit, with a good many words which a man does not use if he can help it.


Works Cited

Campbell, Norman R. "The Word 'Scientist' or Its Substitute." Nature, vol. 114, no. 2874, 29 Nov. 1924, p. 788, doi: 10.1038/114788a0.
Chambers, R. W. "The Word 'Scientist' or Its Substitute." Nature, vol. 114, no. 2875, 6 Dec. 1924, p. 824, doi: 10.1038/114824f0.
[Gregory, Richard.] Reply to "The Word 'Scientist' or Its Substitute," by Norman R. Campbell. Nature, vol. 114, no. 2874, 29 Nov. 1924, p. 788, doi: 10.1038/114788b0.
Secord, James. "Mary Somverville's Vision of Science." Physics Today, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 46-52. Scitation, doi: 10.1063/PT.3.3817.
Wells, H. G. The Food of the Gods, and How It Came to Earth. 1904. Project Gutenberg, 26 Dec. 2020, www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11696/pg11696-images.html.
[Whewell, William.] Review of On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences, by Mrs. Somerville. Quarterly Review, vol. 51, Mar. 1834, pp. 54-68. HathiTrust, babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015074711394&view=1up&seq=64.

04 June 2021

Darwin and the Revolution

I am back to working on my book project, for the first time since January. (I wouldn't claim that under normal circumstances I produce copious academic work during the semester, but the exigencies of the pandemic have really cut my during-the-semester work down to nothing.) I'm revising a chapter from my dissertation about novels of political violence that feature biologists and use Darwinian rhetoric.

This chapter was a relative late add to the dissertation. In my proposal, I had a chapter that discussed three novels of political violence; this became seven novels of political violence later on. Eventually I split that up into two chapters each covering three novels, and shunted one of the novels into a different chapter. That meant the new chapter had no real framework. I think it cited a sentence apiece from two different sources in support of its claims about social Darwinism! Social Darwinism was, indeed, something I knew very little about. But, you know, a good dissertation is a done dissertation, and I marked this all down on my to-do list for revising it into a book.

Thus I have spent the past month learning about social Darwinism. It turns out that I did not know very much!

To understand social Darwinism, we don't begin with Darwin, but we actually begin in the 1950s. The term was popularized by Richard Hofstadter, a professor of history, in his book Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860–1915 (1944). This book defined "social Darwinism" as a justification for laissez-faire ruthless capitalism, arguing that it was popular especially in America. Basically, Hofstadter's idea went, social Darwinism was the self-serving justification of people who either 1) crushed other people on their way to the top, or 2) wanted to remove all government rules preventing them from crushing people on their way to the top. These social Darwinists claimed any such crushing was the "survival of the fittest," and you couldn't say that was bad, that was how nature worked, and what it produced was, definitionally, the fittest!

A lot of people have criticized Hofstadter for a lot of reasons, but I don't know enough to assess most of of the criticisms. The one that seems particularly interesting to me is twofold. The first part is that there was no such thing as social Darwinism. What I mean by this is that the term "social Darwinism" indicates there is a difference between applying Darwinism to the biological arena and applying Darwinism to the social arena. The social arena was the biological arena. The British historian James Moore has done some strong work explaining what, in a historical sense, "Darwinism" means and how its originators meant the term. Some seek to defend Darwin by saying social Darwinism was a misapplication of his theory, but this neglects both how he devised it and how he himself used it.

For example, Moore points out in his article "Socializing Darwinism," that Darwinism was derived in part from Malthusianism, which was all about society: "Both Malthus and Darwin believed in the beneficent necessity of the laws of nature that give rise to a struggle for existence in human populations. Both believed the dictate of these laws was that individuals ought generally to enjoy the fruits of their foresight or suffer the pains of their improvidence. Both believed that the degrees of material success or failure in question are direct indications of moral worth and, as such, ought not to be mitigated" (Science as Politics, edited by Les Levidow, Free Association Books, 1986, p. 52). It was not a distinction drawn in the creation of his theory.

Diane B. Paul argues that social Darwinism "was a term that would have baffled Darwin. In Victorian England, scientists took for granted that biological facts mattered for social theory and policy" ("Darwin, Social Darwinism, and Eugenics," The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2nd ed., edited by Jonathan Hodge and Gregory Radick, Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 229). Similarly, according to Moore, "The routine distinction made today between 'Darwinism' and 'Social Darwinism' would have been lost on the author of the Descent of Man, and probably on most of his defenders until the 1890s” (p. 62). For Darwin and his adherents-- and detractors!-- Darwinism was social Darwinism.

(Now, there are some critics who use this to argue no one should go around using the term "social Darwinism" at all, or that it should only be used to identify a very narrow group of people who self-identified as social Darwinists. This I don't think follows. It does seem useful to have a term that describes the concept of applying evolution by natural selection to social organization even if the original Darwinists wouldn't have made that distinction themselves.)

The second part of the criticism I want to highlight follows from the first: because Darwinism was social Darwinism, everybody who was engaging with Darwin's ideas was doing it. So it wasn't just right-wingers looking to grind down competitors in Progressive-Era America who were claiming Darwinian backing, it was everyone who was interesting in making a theory of society. So as Paul points out, Darwinism was used to justify laissez faire, to justify colonialism, to justify socialism, to justify eugenics (p. 240). It was used to justify anarchism, and some anarchists even made use of eugenics, as Richard Cleminson discusses in his book Anarchism and Eugenics: An Unlikely Convergence (Manchester UP, 2019). (Some people argue eugenics is a kind of social Darwinism; some people argue very vehemently that it is not.) How could anarchists-- people who reject state control-- allow arguable the ultimate form of state control of the individual? Paul Crook's Darwinism, War and History: The Debate over the Biology of War (Cambridge UP, 1994) discusses how Darwin was used to justify military conflicts and became a secular source of pacifism for the "peace biologists."

I like how J. W. Burrow puts it in his book The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (Yale UP, 2000): "What Social Darwinists chiefly argued about, without consciously putting it in those terms, which would have given the game away, was which form of competition was desirable and ensured progress or, if one adapted to it successfully, survival, and which types of competition should be suppressed; to have recognized them all as potentially operative, as a Darwinian would do in biology, would have removed the point" (p. 94). That is to say, even if you believed the government should stop your business from crushing other businesses-- survival of the fittest, after all-- you probably did believe that the government should prosecute people who tried to steal from your business-- even though surely that was survival of the fittest too!

Very few people disagreed on whether Darwin applied to social life, they just disagreed on what was "natural" and should be allowed, and what was supposedly stymieing evolution and thus should not be allowed. If you were a socialist, you thought capitalism an unnatural development holding back evolution. First decide who you want to be victors/survivors, then "endorse or condemn forms of competition depending on whether they seemed likely to ensure the desired result" (Burrow, p. 94). 

Most socialists who drew on Darwin seemed to skew toward the peaceful end; in his book Socialism and Modern Science (Darwin, Spencer, Marx) (1894), the Italian crimonologist Enrico Ferri argued that science showed violence was in fact not part of the revolution: "the processes of evolution and revolution—the only wholly social or collective processes—are the most efficacious, while partial rebellion and, still more, individual violence have only a very feeble power of social transformation" (p. 145). For Ferri, "revolution" meant "the concluding phase of an evolution" and was not to be used "in the current and incorrect sense of a stormy and violent revolt" (p. 141). Darwinism validate peaceful transition. But Ferri's book was translated into English by the "millionaire socialist" Robert Rives La Monte, who argued in his essay "Science and Revolution" (1909) that "a social cataclysm or revolution to be necessary to break the shell of capitalism within which the chick of the Society of Fellowship has been developing" (p. 105). He ended his essay by declaiming, "Let us be careful not to go to extremes and deny the fact and the fruitfulness of slow evolution, but let us with equal determination assert the necessity and efficacy of cataclysmic revolution! […] I find it difficult, I repeat, to see how any sane man […] can not believe a cataclysmic revolution not only inevitable, but a consummation devoutly to be desired" (p. 113). Even within the same ideology, you could apply Darwinism and get two completely contradictory results.

Paul admits it might all be rhetoric... but "rhetoric can be a potent resource" (p. 242). And it was a potent rhetoric too. If you were using Darwinism, Burrow argues that every struggle was magnified in importance: "Great-power status, imperialist expansion, the control of crime or disease, were spoken of [...] as matters of national life or death. Class and racial tensions too were projected onto the scale of world history, of continuing social evolution, as though the fate of nations or humanity, with alternatives of utopia or the extremity of grovelling degeneracy, of world domination or ultimate extinction or enslavement, hung poised in the balance" (pp. 95-6). Every little struggle became charged with cosmic significance.

Little wonder, then, that the writers of the early sf I look it drew on (social) Darwinism so much.

16 July 2020

The Scientist in Victorian Literature: Tertius Lydgate, Surgeon (Middlemarch, 1871-72)

Trade paperback, 853 pages
Published 2003 (originally 1871-72)

Acquired October 2012
Previously read December 2012
R
eread December 2019
Middlemarch by George Eliot
In the British climate there is no incompatibility between scientific insight and furnished lodgings: the incompatibility is chiefly between scientific ambition and a wife who objects to that kind of residence. (679)
Middlemarch is the Victorian scientist novel. If you want a novel about a scientist whose epistemological virtues do not carry over to his personal life, this is it. And if you want a novel about perception, this is it: this novel is about how people perceive other people, how people perceive others’ perceptions, how the novelists perceives people’s perceptions of other’s perceptions. It’s hard to write about, because every idea you have resonates backward and forward through the novel, and soon you’re taking in all 800-plus pages of it in order to make a simple point. The original draft of the Middlemarch section of my book was 9,000 words (25 pages), which honestly isn’t too bad, except it needed to share a chapter with Kingsley’s Two Years Ago, and besides: what can you say about Tertius Lydate that hasn’t already been said? There’s so much, and Anne DeWitt’s Moral Authority, Men of Science, and the Victorian Novel (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Ian Duncan’s “George Eliot and the Science of the Human” (A Companion to George Eliot, 2013) largely reflect the way I see him already. My real interest in Middlemarch is in Dorothea Brooke, who I would argue is a descendant of Two Years Ago’s Grace Harvey.

So I reread Middlemarch last fall in order to revise my chapter. I took over 3,500 words of notes on it, which didn’t bode well for cutting, but as it currently stands, I got the discussion of Middlemarch down to 7,500 words (18 pages). I did this by cutting material on Lydgate as well as some extended discussions of related issues that weren’t necessary to make my point about Dorothea. So this post here is a reworked version of my cut material, which mostly focuses on attempts to see “systematically”: to come up with all-encompassing theories that manage to account for everything.

Tertius Lydgate, like Tom Thurnall in Two Years Ago, comes to a rural community with ideas of medical reform and a scientific way of seeing. Unlike Tom, Lydgate has few inclinations toward natural history: Lydgate’s interests lie in human tissues, as he seeks knowledge of the fundamental structure of biology. Lydgate believes that to tackle a problem he must see systematically: “The more he became interested in special questions of disease, such as the nature of fever or fevers, the more keenly he felt the need for that fundamental knowledge of structure” (147). Knowledge of the whole is necessary for the understanding of the parts, because the parts and the whole are interrelated—Lydgate will not be able to carry out reform of medicine as a practice until he has found “the primitive tissue”: “No man, one sees, can understand and estimate the entire structure or its parts – what are its frailties and what its repairs, without knowing the nature of the materials.… Here would be another light, as of oxy-hydrogen, showing the very grain of things, and revising all former explanations” (148). Lydgate’s understanding of his own work is as a form of sight: a light cast into the darkness in order to see what no one else can see. With that vision, he plans to reform the way the medical profession operates, and thus save lives.

In addition to changing the way the science of medicine works, Lydgate will also need to change a social practice: the operation of medical hospitals. He is hopeful that Middlemarch might be the place to make this happen, telling Bulstrode the banker (who funds the hospital), “A fine fever hospital in addition to the old infirmary might be the nucleus of a medical school here, when once we get our medical reforms; and what would do more for medical education than the spread of such schools over the country?” (124). Lydgate sees the village as a space where medical reform can be carried out in microcosm, a model for the potential reform of the nation. If Lydgate can implement his scientific changes to treatment with success at the Middlemarch hospital, he believes—quite ambitiously—that the improvements will spread throughout the nation. Lydgate hopes to systematize medical knowledge as a foundation for national regeneration. Gaining access to the underlying structure of biology will enable this to happen.

Lydgate is a better medical man than the old-fashioned ones who precede him in his town, despite the fact that they are physicians, and he a mere surgeon. (They hold doctorates, whereas he does not, though he is the one hoping to keep science wedded to medical practice.*) He uses a stethoscope to enhance his perceptions—which the narrator assures us “had not become a matter of course in practice at that time” (286)—and he does not overprescribe medicines where they are unnecessary. When he is called in to treat Casaubon, he gives the man a great deal of personal attention, bringing to mind the thoughtfulness of Mr. Gibson in Wives and Daughters. But Lydgate’s perceptions are inconsistently applied; like Mr. Gibson, he often fails to apply them outside the scientific realm, and like Mr. Gibson, this failing is most potently driven home when he enters into an undesirable marriage.

The whole trajectory of Lydgate’s engagement to Rosamond Vincy is one of mutual misunderstanding, which persists into their marriage. When the two are flirting, Rosamond is angling for a husband, but he takes it as nothing of importance: “there was a delightful interchange of influence in their eyes.… [T]hey flirted; and Lydgate was secure in the belief that they did nothing else. If a man could not love and be wise, surely he could flirt and be wise at the same time?” (268). Despite his observations of Rosamond, Lydgate is fooled by the surface perceptions: because he does not want to be in love again (he had a disastrous love affair in Paris when he was younger, and foreswore romance), he does not perceive that Rosamond desires a romantic relationship. The narrator compares the way the two see each other: Rosamond “had a shaping activity and looked through watchful blue eyes, whereas Lydgate’s lay blind and unconcerned as a jelly-fish which gets melted without knowing it” (271). The only object he perceives here is his pleasure in the flirtation, and like Mr. Gibson, this results in him drifting into a romantic relationship without fully considering it implications.

For example, during his engagement, Lydgate’s interactions with Rosamond “interfere with the diligent use of spare hours which might serve… to make the great, imminent discovery” (349). Lydgate tells his friend Farebrother, the vicar, that he is hopeful that once he’s married, he will have more time to devote to his science, as all the business of being engaged will be over with: once married, the man of science “has everything at home then” (349). This turns out to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of marriage: Lydgate will have more to do at home if he wants to maintain a marriage successfully, not less.

Lydgate’s problem is that he is unable to apply his scientific sight to the social. Late in the novel, Lydgate reflects on the difference between him and Rosamond:
His superior knowledge and mental force, instead of being, as he had imagined, a shrine to consult on all occasions, was simply set aside on every practical question. He had regarded Rosamond’s cleverness as precisely that of the receptive kind which became a woman. He was now beginning to find out what that cleverness was…. No one quicker than Rosamond to see causes and effects which lay within the track of her own tastes and interests… (586)
The difference between Lydgate and Rosamond rests in their abilities to see the minute details of complex structures: there is much that is invisible to Lydgate that Rosamond sees clearly. He thinks he is clever because he can see cellular structure, but society is an order of magnitude more complex than anything he observes, and his scientific skills fail him when he attempts to apply them in the human realm. Lydgate partially becomes aware of this fact near the beginning of Middlemarch; when he is trying to decide who to vote for as hospital chaplain, he realizes that every possible choice has an infinitude of possible reactions that make it impossible to make a perfect one: “For the first time Lydgate was feeling the hampering threadlike pressure of small social conditions, and their frustrating complexity” (180). But this understanding does not stick with him throughout the novel; in his arrogance or naïveté, Lydgate assumes he has the full understanding of both his own marriage and the social situation of Middlemarch when he does not. Lydgate’s difficulties with societal observations allow Eliot to test the concept of systematic sight’s application to human beings: if the man of science cannot observe his community or even his marriage with clarity because the myriad factors that make it up are too much for him to account for, how can he hope to make observations of all society

Lydgate’s difficulties with social observation result in the failure of his attempts at reforms. He never makes his big medical breakthrough, never isolates the primitive tissue. And his inability to observe the complexities of social interaction mean that many in Middlemarch view him with suspicion. Lydgate’s more scientific way of seeing makes him unpopular with the other medical men, who find him arrogant: “They implied he was insolent, pretentious, and given to that reckless innovation for the sake of noise and show which was the essence of the charlatan” (454). Because Lydgate finds it difficult to navigate the complexities of the social system, he is unable to make friends with those who should be his greatest allies, and instead they set themselves against him, opposing his efforts to change the way medicine is done in Middlemarch. Rumors even circulate that he dissects the bodies of the dead for his experiments, because Lydgate is not sufficiently attentive to the feelings of the family of a deceased patient: “For Lydgate having attended Mrs Goby, who died apparently of a heart-disease not very clearly expressed in the symptoms, too daringly asked leave of her relatives to open the body” (455).

Lydgate is not able to turn his scientific vision upon the social realm with  accuracy, and it hurts him in the long run, when the town becomes suspicious that Lydgate may have played a role in the death of Raffles in order to help Bulstrode the banker. It is too easy for Middlemarch to believe Lydgate capable of such a thing because Lydgate has “long been sneered at as making himself subservient to the banker for the sake of working himself into predominance, and discrediting the older members of his profession” (720). Obviously Lydgate is not solely at fault here; the townspeople jump to hasty conclusions based on their preexisting biases. But these mistaken conclusions were aided by Lydgate’s inability to master the complexities of the social situation in Middlemarch, and Lydgate is forced out of the town, his hopes of medical reform dashed. Seeing like a scientist has been for naught; he has not located the primitive tissue he devoted his life’s researches to, his marriage has suffered because he does not know how to communicate with his wife, and his visions of medical reform will never be realized.

It’s not just Lydgate, though. Middlemarch is full of people trying to scientifically observe and/or systematize human experience, and often failing. Part of the problem is egoism, of sifting out the observer’s own thoughts and position from an observation. The narrator renders this problem of perspective with another visual thought-experiment:
Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished steel… will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all directions; but place now against a lighted candle as a centre of illuminations, and lo! the scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going everywhere impartially, and it is only your candle which produces the flattering illusion…. These things are a parable. The scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of any person now absent. (264)
The metaphor employed here compares observing human events to an experiment involving light and glass, and the danger of assuming that one’s position in a system of events is the primary one because one is incapable of removing oneself from the scene. This is a recurrent threat throughout Middlemarch; the accuracy of characters’ observations is often endangered by what they desire to see. Middlemarch suggests that despite any commitments to objectivity an observer might have, it is easy to run afoul of believing one’s self to be objective when we are not. No one is at the center of the universe, but it is easy to believe it.

I always kind of struggle with liking Will Ladislaw, but Eliot positions him as a positive alternative to the problems that Lydgate and Casaubon struggle with, and this comes down to his artistic inclinations. Ladislaw can see things in Casaubon and Dorothea that they cannot see in each other. He knows that “Casaubon hated him – he knew that very well; on his first entrance he could discern a bitterness in the mouth and a venom in the glance,” and he also sees Dorothea’s sadness: “he painted to himself what were Dorothea’s inward sorrows” (360). The importance of art for creating sympathy is why in her essay “The Natural History of German Life” (Selected Essays, Poems and Other Writings, Penguin, 1990), Eliot declares that “the unreality of their [peasants’] representations is a grave evil” (110). If we depend on art to be sympathetic, then art must do its best to be accurate. What Eliot ends up suggesting is an alliance between the novel and science. The distance of science can be combined with the closeness of the novel to make truly useful observations, for a true understanding of character will “check our theories, and direct us in their application” (“Natural History” 111). The novelist is the only one who has the knowledge of the particularity of human character necessary for ensuring that the application of systematic theories to human society is accurate and thus moral.

There is hope for the characters within the novel, too, which Eliot shows through Dorothea’s actions at the climax of the story. Here, she goes back and re-observes an earlier encounter with Rosamond and Ladislaw with her “vivid sympathetic experience,” which “asserted itself as acquired knowledge asserts itself and will not let us see as we saw in the day of our ignorance” (788). She quite literally cannot see the way that she used to. She does not know everything, but she can discern that there are “hidden as well as evident troubles” in the Lydgate marriage (788). At this moment, Dorothea looks outside and sees “involuntary, palpitating life”: a woman with a baby, a shepherd with a dog, the field beyond the entrance gate. Dorothea experiences sympathy in the way that “The Natural History of German Life” calls for all would-be sociologists to do so, and armed in this way, she is able to help Rosamond and Ladislaw.

What she tells Rosamond is based on a misinterpretation of events—but it helps Rosamond anyway and, in fact, it is exactly what Rosamond needed to hear. Through this scene, Eliot suggests that when scientists anchor their observations with sympathy, they can do good, and even if they have misunderstood the situation, their actions can be beneficial to others regardless. Dorothea’s actions here are just the beginning of her finally fulfilling her desire to help change the world, now through her marriage to Ladislaw, which makes sense given what we were told earlier of his strong sympathy. James Scott’s “George Eliot, Positivism, and the Social Vision of Middlemarch” (Victorian Studies, vol. 16, Sept. 1972) points out that “her marriage to Ladislaw… is a substantial force for change, promising to break down eventually the restrictive class barriers of the Middlemarch gentry” (173-4). Ladislaw even becomes a reform politician. Dorothea is finally beginning to have an impact in the world, even if it’s not quite the one she always wanted. Systematic reform, Middlemarch argues, is beyond the capacities of our science to realize. Dorothea’s housing scheme might have been thwarted by her marriage to Ladislaw, but it was probably never going to work anyway. She is, however, able to make a couple other significant architectural interventions, as I discuss in my book, drawing on Heather Miner’s “Reforming Space: The Architectural Imaginary of Middlemarch” (Victorian Review, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 2012) and Barbara Leckie’s Open Houses: Poverty, the Novel, and the Architectural Idea in Nineteenth-Century Britain (U of Pennsylvania P, 2018).

The moment where Dorothea helps Rosamond despite her misunderstanding was foreshadowed all the way back at the beginning of Middlemarch, where the narrator points out the tendency of young women to interpret facts incorrectly, but then claims that the result is not necessarily bad: “They are not always too grossly deceived; for Sinbad himself may have fallen by good luck on a true description, and wrong reasoning sometimes land poor mortals in right conclusions: starting a long way off the true point, and proceeding by loops and zig-zags, we now and then arrive just where we ought to be” (25). Everyone is but a poor mortal trying to do their best in solving the world’s problems, but if they look around keenly and let the novelist guide their sympathies, they might give some moral benefit to the world, even if it’s not the good they intended, whether they have scientific detachment on their side or not.

On my dissertation, one of my committee members wrote after my discussion of Middlemarch, “Why moral benefit? On the side of science, one could argue that moral benefits are not a primary but rather a secondary goal of scientific inquiry. Is there something wrongheaded, when viewed from a history of science perspective, about novelists’ torquing the goals and justification of scientific observation into an account of its social benefits? In other words, shouldn’t literature have its own domain, and science its own methods?” I think this might possibly be true in general, but Middlemarch is a novel about sociology and medicine, two sciences that are supposedly entirely focused on benefiting human beings. Knowledge for its own sake is not what these sciences promise, and those promises are (among many many other things) what Middlemarch puts to the test.

* Probably I'm just stupid, but British medical titles are often a muddle at best. Irvine Loudon’s “Why Are (Male) Surgeons Still Addressed as Mr?” (British Medical Journal, vol. 231, Dec. 2000) indicates that “[p]hysicians were gentlemen with a university education who dealt with internal diseases, arrived at a diagnosis on the basis of the history and external appearance of the patient, and prescribed in Latin. In theory, but seldom in practice, their supposedly superior knowledge gave them a monopoly over the practice of physic and the authority to supervise the work of surgeons” (1589). Lydgate is a “general practitioner,” also known as a “surgeon-apothecary,” but unlike other surgeon-apothecaries, he does not dispense medicine, viewing it as a conflict of interest. Loudon’s article lays out the distinctions, such as they exist, in full.